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[T]here is a common notion among appointed defense lawyers that
their responsibility ends with conviction; after that the defendant
is a problem for the social worker or penologist.
[But] counsel is the defendant's advocate. If the system is to be
humanized and individualized-made to accommodate the needs of
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little reminder that a vast majority of criminal defendants are ul-
timately convicted--either by plea or by trial.2 The hard facts that
most defendants are convicted and that they then enter the correc-
tional system have resulted in an attitude in the legal community
that the role of defense counsel is limited and hapless.3 Too often,
the view "out of sight, out of mind" has been demonstrated by both
society and the legal profession once the prison door is slammed
shut behind another new inmate.
4
While the 1960's witnessed a revolution in pretrial and trial crim-
inal procedure,5 this decade has been marked by a judicial and social
awakening to the plight of the convicted offender. The most obvi-
ous sign of this awakening is the 1969 United States Supreme Court
case of Johnson v. Avery. 6 As if to prime the pump for the flood
2. In one study, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
showed an overall conviction rate of 81 per cent. As evidence of the success
of the defense bar, only 13 per cent of the felony complaints were dismissed
at the preliminary examination stage and 6 per cent of the filings were re-
duced to misdemeanors. Out of the 33,000 defendants arraigned in the Los
Angeles Superior Court in 1970, 8.2 per cent won dismissal on pretrial mo-
tions. Of the 11 per cent of cases that proceeded to trial, 62 per cent of
the bench trials and 69 per cent of the jury trials resulted in conviction.
GREENwOOD, WLDHORN , PoGGIo, STRUmxwAssER & DE LEON, PROSECUTION OF
ADULT FELONY DErENDANTs nN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
ix-x (1973).
3. Most popular, so-called practitioner's texts have merely a passing ref-
erence or no reference at all to the issue of post-conviction legal representa-
tion in other than an appeal or collateral attack by extraordinary writ, or
proceedings to revoke probation or parole. See, e.g., AmsTERDivr, TRIL
MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF C nINAL CASES (3d ed. 1974); Cn'Es & PEx-
NY-PAcKER, CRVINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES (1969).
4. See, e.g., Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for
Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493
(1970); Wexler, Counseling Convicts: The Lawyer's Role in Uncovering
Legitimate Claims, 11 ARIz. L. REV. 629 (1969); Comment, Post Conviction
Legal Aid in County Jails: A Model Law Student Counseling Program, 4
GoLDEN GAE L. REv. 97 (1973).
5. See Cox, THE WAP E CoURT 71-91 (1968); Pye, The Warren Court
and Criminal Procedure, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRmcAL AxALYsIs 58-
77 (1969). An excellent collection of the Warren Court's cases on criminal
law and procedure can be found in THE CsnvnnAL LAW REPORTER, THE Cmvr-
riAL LAW REVOLUTION AD ITS AFTERMATH (1975).
6. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
In its last full term of the decade, the Court handed down a number of
decisions which significantly improved the lot of prisoners seeking post-con-
viction relief by way of habeas corpus. See Williams v. Oklahoma City,
395 U.S. 458 (1969); Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969); Kauf-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
of post-conviction issues that would soon be pressed on the courts,
the Johnson decision supported the right of incarcerated offenders
to have access to legal assistance. Addressing itself to the problems
of both the convicted and the pretrial inmate populace, the Court
scrutinized a Tennessee prison regulation which prohibited legal as-
sistance of one inmate to another.1 The Court, through Justice
Fortas, ruled that the effect of such a ban, particularly "in the ab-
sence of any other source of assistance," was to prevent totally or
functionally illiterate inmates from access to the courts.8 The reg-
ulation was therefore held unconstitutional. However, the Court
failed to mandate any specific plan to insure inmates effective ac-
cess to the courts.9
Free to seek out legal assistance, the incarcerated offender
was heard with increased frequency. In 1970, the California
Supreme Court took its first, faltering step in the field by re-
viewing claims by inmates at San Quentin and Folsom prisons.' 0
But a significant decision of the court was not handed down until
five years later. In February, 1975, the court, in Brown v.
Pitchess," sustained a trial court injunction requiring the County
7. See Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No Assistance" Regulations
and the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 DuxE L.J. 343 (an excellent discussion of
the role of the jailhouse lawyer written before the Johnson case was decided
by the Supreme Court). See also BOSTON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CIn%.AL
JusTIcE, PERSPECTIVES ON PRISON LEGAL SERVICES: NEEDS, IMNPACT AND THE
POTENTIAL LAw SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT (1972).
8. 393 U.S. at 487.
Nearly thirty years earlier, in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), the Su-
preme Court voided a prison regulation which prohibited a prisoner's direct
access to the courts.
9. 393 U.S. at 489-90.
Pointing to a variety of experiments in other states offering post-convic-
tion assistance, including expansion of public defender services, employ-
ment of law students, and voluntary bar association projects, the Court
stated:
We express no judgment concerning these plans, but their exis-
tence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives
if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates. Id.
See Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal
Services in the Criminal Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REv. 493, 589-613
(1970).
10. In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
Utilizing a test that balanced the "extent of restriction" against the "need
for restriction," the court struck down, as violative of Johnson, a regulation
prohibiting one prisoner's legal material from being in the possession of an-
other inmate. However, the court upheld regulations which prohibited jail-
house lawyers from communicating with prisoners at other facilities, inter-
viewing prisoners in isolation, and reviewing disciplinary records. Addi-
tionally, the court upheld regulations that jail-house lawyers were limited
to assisting and not representing prisoners and that a jail-house lawyer
could keep only a limited number of law books in his cell at any one time.
11. 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975).
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of Los Angeles to provide sentenced inmates in the local jail with
an attorney to assist them in seeking post-conviction relief.12 The
central role of counsel in insuring access to the courts and repre-
senting the convicted on issues arising after the determination of
guilt was thereby confirmed and sanctioned. 13
In one sense, the Brown decision might be viewed as but a small
segment of a larger revolution involving rights of both incarcerated
and released offenders.' 4 Indeed, recent reform cases such as Wolff
v. McDonnell,15 Gagnon v. Scarpelli,'1 Morrissey v. Brewer,17 and
in California, In re Bye,'1 In re Sturm,'9 and Northern v. Nelson,20
12. Id. at 523-24, 531 P.2d at 777, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 209-10.
Subsequent to the supreme court opinion, the trial court denied applica-
tion for permanent injunctive relief and dissolved the preliminary injunc-
tion. The class has been expanded, however, to include both pretrial and
sentenced inmates, and the case is now set for trial. Telephone interview
with Attorney Terry Smerling, counsel for inmate plaintiffs, Oct. 1, 1975.
13. See McClain v. Manson, 343 F. Supp. 382 (D. Conn. 1972); Clutchette
v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal 1971), aff'd as modified and re-
manded, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and remanded on rehearing,
510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Enomoto v. Clutchette,
95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Allison v. Wilson, 277 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
14. See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975) (prisoner's non-
disciplinary transfer); Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) (avail-
ability of habeas corpus challenge after a plea of guilty); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison mail censorship); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974) (access to defense investigators and law students); Gilmore v.
Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Younger v. Gil-
more, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (access to prison libraries); In re Jordan, 12
Cal. 3d 575, 526 P.2d 523, 116 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1974) (attorney-client privilege
for legal correspondence).
15. 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (procedural due process compelled in prison disci-
plinary actions). See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 44 U.S.L.W. 4487 (U.S. April
20, 1976).
See Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Proceedings-
The Supreme Court Responds, 53 N.C.L. REv. 793 (1975).
16. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (procedural due process compelled in probation
revocation).
See Note, Due Process Rights in Parole and Probation Revocations, 6
CoNw. L. REv. 559 (1974).
17. 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (procedural due process compelled in parole
revocation).
See Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and Parole
Revocation, 8 Cunm. L. BuLL. 616 (1972).
18. 12 Cal. 3d 96, 524 P.2d 854, 115 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1974) (recommitment
of narcotic outpatient).
19. 11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974) (requirement
of specification for denial of parole).
20. 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (prisoner's right to receive reli-
gious literature). .1
clearly point to a new judicial consciousness of the need to define
rights and remedies which have long been neglected. Yet, in a more
specific sense, cases like Brown go beyond articulating abstract legal
rights. The thrust of these decisions indicates that if voluntary, cre-
ative plans are not produced by custodial officials in and out of
penal institutions, then implementation will occur by judicial fiat.
2
1
In addition to legislative and judicial reform in the post-convic-
tion realm, the practicing bar must play a central role in insuring
that those who are convicted lose only those rights and privileges
22
which are rationally related to the correctional process. Attorneys
who recently have become sensitized to the expanded role of coun-
sel at the sentencing stage in criminal cases 23 must also begin to
focus their talents on more effective representation after their cli-
ents have been convicted and enter the correctional system.
The purpose of this article is to acquaint the practitioner and gen-
eral legal community with the means available to an attorney in
providing complete and on-going representation to his convicted
client. Although the post-conviction revolution has seen the adju-
dication of grave issues of the highest constitutional order, many
times in the context of a class action,24 the need for effective rep-
resentation of the individual client is pressing. Additionally, there
is an important role for counsel to fill as the client exits the cor-
rectional system and re-enters society. The focus will be upon two
of the most common client needs: modification of orders of proba-
tion and mitigation of criminal records-in effect, the decriminaliza-
tion of the convicted client. Despite the natural role of counsel
in serving these needs, it is the premise of this article that these
areas are poorly understood and sorely neglected by counsel. Yet,
both are areas in which counsel can assist the client in obtaining
significant judicial relief.
What will not be discussed here, but is certainly of equal signif-
icance, is representation in government-initiated action occurring
after conviction.25 These actions include probation revocation pro-
21. See Detainees v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
22. See Note, Civil Death-A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, 11 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 988 (1970); Note, Restoration of Deprived Rights, 10 WM.
& MAY L. REV. 924 (1969).
23. See DAwsoN, SENTENCING, THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH AND
C01DITONS OF SENTENCE (1969); Note, Disclosure of Presentence Reports:
A Constitutional Right to Rebut Adverse Information by Cross-Examina-
tion, 3 RUTGERS-CAVIDEN L.J. 111 (1971).
24. See cases cited notes 14, 21 supra.
25. Also outside the scope of this article is a discussion of the central
and creative role of counsel at the sentencing stage. Significant alternatives
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ceedings,20 commonly instituted by the probation department,
parole revocation proceedings before the California Adult Author-
ity,2 7 and detainer-holds lodged by other jurisdictions that may re-
sult in rendition proceedings.
28
THE ROLE OF COUNsEL
A question now exists whether there is a real and substantial
role for counsel to perform in the decriminalization of the convicted
offender. Of course, the duty to provide active representation from
the initiation of criminal proceeding on through to the termination
of the correctional process has yet to be clarified. Nevertheless,
as Judge Bazelon noted,29 the tendency of defense counsel has
may be explored by counsel concerning the issues to be decided by the
court, i.e., local jail custody versus state prison, formal or summary proba-
tion, fine and restitution in lieu of incarceration. See DAWSON, SENTENCING,
TnE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969). See
generally ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRnVNAL JUSTICE RELATING TO SENTENCING
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Approved Draft 1968).
26. With regard to the law and procedure relating to probation revoca-
tion, see Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1203.2 (a), 1203.3 (West 1970).
27. General procedural guidelines can be found in DEPARTMENT OF COR-
RECTIONS, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES MANUAL
(1975).
The Morrissey decision suggests appropriate situations for representation
by counsel and establishes a two-step revocation process-probable cause
hearing and determination hearing. Additionally, the probationer is en-
titled, as a matter of due process, to written notice, confrontation, presenta-
tion of favorable evidence, a hearing by a neutral body, and a written deci-
sion with findings of fact. See Lowenstein, Bringing the Rule of Law to
Parole, 9 CLEARING HOUSE REV. 769 (1975); Singer, Morrissey v. Brewer:
Implications for the Future of Correctional Law, 6 CLEARING HOUSE REV.
315 (1972). See also Cassov, The Morrissey Maelstrom: Recent Develop-
ments in California Parole and Probation Revocation, 9 U. SAN FRAN. L.
RBu. 43 (1974); Comment, Parole Holds: Their Effect on the Rights of the
Parolee and the Operation of the Parole System, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 759
(1972).
28. See, e.g., Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7
CPim. L. BL. 669 (1971); Wexler & Hershey, Criminal Detainers in a Nut-
shell, 7 CRUm. L. BULL. 753 (1971); Yackle, Taking Stock of Detainer Stat-
utes, 8 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 88 (1975).
29. Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the duty of defense counsel in this regard may not be so much
a legal or ethical obligation as a moral duty.
Counsel, as defendant's advocate, is the one who must prod the
system's conscience to insure that the man is not lost for the crime.
been to surrender his client's fate into the hands of the social
worker and penologist upon conviction. It is apparent that at least
the "aspirational" standards existing in the area of criminal defense
representation envisage and encourage an active and on-going role
for counsel. The ABA Standards provide:
Counsel should be provided at every stage of the proceedings,
including sentencing, appeal and post-conviction review. Counsel
initially appointed should continue to represent the defendant
through all stages of the proceedings .... 30
Echoing a similar theme, Judge Bazelon has issued a plea for coun-
sel to become "advocate of the whole man."3' 1 To implement this
admonition, the attorney should counsel the client throughout the
entire criminal justice system.
The needs which should be brought to the court's attention are
significant. Convicted offenders generally have their cases disposed
of either by incarceration, probation, or a combination of the two.
The decision concerning the appropriate disposition is often made
either on sketchy, stale data concerning the defendant and his of-
fense or on facts and conditions as they exist at sentencing. How-
ever a true rehabilitative and correctional process demands that
treatment of offenders be subject to alteration if conditions change
to the benefit or detriment of the convicted offender.3 2 Doubt-
... Such an expanded role may not be constitutionally mandated,
but it may well be a moral imperative. It is the humane thing
to do.
Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. Cnr. L. REV. 1, 46
(1973).
30. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINA, JUSTICE RELATING TO PROVIDING DE-
FENSE SERVICES § 5.2, at 46 (Approved Draft 1967) (emphasis added). See
also ABA, STANMARDS FOR CRNAL JUSTICE RELATING TO THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION §§ 1.1, at 171, 8.5, at 305 (Approved Draft 1971). But see JuDI-
crAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AanmicAw BAR As-
socATIN Mu= STANmARDs FOR CRIINAL JUSTICE wiTH CALIFORNIA LAW
16, 17 (1974), which notes:
No state statute requires that the same attorney appointed to rep-
resent the defendant must continue such representation through the
remainder of the proceedings.
31. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
45 (1973).
Of course, the phrase "whole man" will be construed in light of its in-
tended meaning as referring to both sexes. Although males constitute the
majority of the convicted offender populace, females are entering the crim-
inal justice system in increasing numbers. The FBI's Uniform Crime Re-
ports show that during the years from 1960 through 1972, the female ar-
rest rate rose nearly three times faster than that for males. See Adler, The
Rise of the Female Crook, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov., 1975, at 42.
32. See ABA, STAMARDS FOR CRIIvNAL JUSTICE RELATING TO PROBATION
§ 3.3, at 51 (Approved Draft 1970). See also ABA, STANDARDS FOR Cm=NAL
JUSTICE RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 6.2, at
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lessly, probation officers and prosecutors are vigilant in taking steps
to impose additional restraints on offenders who are not respond-
ing to correctional efforts. But how diligent have defense counsels
been in helping offenders remove restraints on freedom through
obtaining sentence reductions or modifying conditions of probation
when those offenders have responded favorably to rehabilitation?
Responses from a sampling of California judges indicate that having
a defense attorney initiate efforts to meet these types of client needs
is indeed rare.33 Similarly, while the probation officer may possess
statutory authority34 to aid the convicted offender in the mitigation
of his criminal record, such aid is not common. Perhaps an en-
hanced understanding of the dimensions and mechanics of de-
criminalization procedures will serve to stimulate affirmative action
in this sorely neglected domain of legal representation. 5
MODIFYING CoNDITIoNs OF PROBATION
The grant of a probationary period36 in lieu of a jail or prison
term has become a commonplace occurrence in California state
courts. A 1965 national survey showed that slightly more than half
of the offenders sentenced in that year were placed on probation,
and the study predicted a substantial increase in this number
over the next ten years. 37 The trend in California, however, has
280, 6.4, at 282 (Approved Draft 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.08 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
33. Informal discussions with these judges indicate that such defense-ini-
tiated post-conviction proceedings occur in no more than 25 per cent of the
appropriate cases.
34. See CAL. PF NAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1970).
35. Because of the unmanageability of this topic on a national scale, the
comment which follows is based mainly on California law and procedures.
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
All offenders, whether convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony, are eligi-
ble to receive a probationary sentence subject to the exceptions specified
in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203(d), 1203.06 and 1203.07 (West Supp. 1976). See
generally Note, Sentencing Under the Proposed California Criminal Code,
19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 526 (1972); Comment, Denial of Probation-Whitfield v.
United States, 21 HAsT. L.J. 1008 (1970).
For a full discussion of the development of probation and parole as cor-
rectional processes, see DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEoRY or PROBATION AND
PAROLE, (2d ed. 1969).
37. The 1965 data from the National Survey of Corrections revealed that
53 per cent of all sentenced offenders were placed on probation during that
year. The prediction was that by 1975 this percentage would rise to ap-
proximately 58 per cent. TnE PRESIDENT'S ComivIIssIoN ON LAw EN-
far outstripped the national average. In 1970, slightly less than sev-
enty per cent of all convicted felons received a probationary sen-
tence, and this state-wide percentage is increasing.38 When a court
grants probation, it retains continuing jurisdiction over the defend-
ant throughout the probationary period.39 It is under these condi-
tions that counsel can assume an active role in the continuing rep-
resentation of the client.
However, when an offender is given a prison term,40 the court
order remanding the individual to the custody of the Department
of Corrections divests the court of jurisdiction to effect any future
modification of the term of incarceration. 41 At this point, control
over the offender rests solely with the California Adult Authority
and the paroling processes. 42 A concomitant loss of ability to assist
the client is suffered by the attorney because all future release de-
cisions are made by the administrative, quasi-judicial body. Until
recently, this tribunal caused great difficulty for counsel by engag-
ing in low visibility decision making. Nevertheless, it is in those
vast majority of cases when probation or a term of local custody43
FORcEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASx FORCE REPORT: CORREC-
TIONS 27 (1967).
38. CALrFORNIA BUREAU OF CRIINAL STATIsTIcs, FELONY DEFENDANTS
DISPOSED OF IN CALIFORNIA COURTS (1970).
A 1972 study showed that somewhat more than 71 per cent of convicted
felons were placed on probation. CALIroRNIA BUREAU OF CRnMNAL STA-
TSTIcS, Cnvm AND DELNQuENcY IN CALIFORNrA: 1972, at 38 (1973). See
generally STATE OF CAL iomaA OrCE or CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING,
CALiFoRN-A CoRREcToNAL SysT m INi STUDY (July, 1974).
39. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.1, 1203.2(b), 1203.3 (West Supp. 1975).
40. For a discussion of judicial considerations in imposing prison terms,
see Murray, Ringer & Alarcon, Prison Reform: Backward or Forward?,
50 CAL. STATE. B.J. 356 (1975).
41. Such general divestment of jurisdiction is, however, subject to the
exceptions set out in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.03 (West Supp. 1975). See Holder v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 779,
463 P.2d 705, 83 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1970). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202(b)
(West Supp. 1976) (young offender commitment).
42. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3020 et seq. (West 1970). See generally Com-
ment, Cruel or Unusual Punishments in California: New Problems in Fit-
ting Punishment to Crimes, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 359 (1975); Comment,
The Adult Authority-Administrative Sentencing and the Parole Decision
as a Problem in Administrative Discretion, 5 U.C.D. L. REV. 360 (1972).
43. In this context, terms of "local custody" refer to incarceration in a
central county jail and minimum security institutions called honor camps.
These facilities may be administered by different agencies, as in the case
of San Diego County, where the Sheriff's Department operates the jail and
the County Probation Department administers the outlying camps. Inmates
are placed in a custodial setting either as one of a series of "conditions"
in a probation order (it is this type of commitment which is of direct in-
terest herein) or by the so-called "straight sentence"; i.e., a commitment
to the custody of the sheriff for a specific period of time, when probation
has not been granted and no part of the sentence has been suspended.
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is imposed as a condition of probation that the attorney can perform
an effective adversarial function and provide continuing legal rep-
resentation.
Courts have held that a term of probation is necessarily imposed
whenever a judge either suspends any portion of a sentence or stays
or suspends the imposition of a sentence.44 Therefore, in cases in
which the court does not wish to sentence an offender to an inde-
terminate term in the state prison system, and thus lose jurisdiction,
the court will probably grant a "suspended sentence." Operation-
ally, this means the court will opt for one of two possible orders:
1. Suspend imposition of sentence so that judgment of convic-
tion is entered in the minutes of the court and all proceedings are
suspended. Should probation be revoked, the court may sentence
the defendant and enter a judgment as if it is his or her first appear-
In those cases where a straight sentence to a term of local custody is im-
posed, the defendant may come under the supervision of a county board
of parole commissioners. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3075-84 (West 1970) em-
power each county to establish a Board of Parole Commissioners and a
County Parole system. Where utilized, this Board has the power to grant
releases to inmates in local custody and to impose up to a two-year par6le
term. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3081 (West 1970); CAL. C.E.B., CALORNiA
CRMNAL LAW PRAcTIcE, voL II, ch. 24 (1968).
In addition to the Board's power to grant parole releases to inmates serv-
ing straight sentences in local facilities, a recent amendment to CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3076 (West Supp. 1976), grants the Board power to parole inmates
in local custody as a condition of probation, unless the grant of probation
specifically prohibits such a parole release.
44. See Oster v. Municipal Court, 45 Cal. 2d 134, 287 P.2d 755 (1955).
Under Oster, whenever the court suspends any portion of a sentence,
whether or not custody is imposed as a condition of probation, the order
is construed as an informal grant of probation. So construed, the court re-
tains jurisdiction over the defendant as if probation had been formally
granted. However, Oster mandates that no such informal grant will be
found when the court has expressly denied probation and when a grant of
probation was clearly not intended. Id. at 139, 287 P.2d at 759. Compare
Balkcom v. Gunn, 206 Ga. 167, 56 S.E.2d 482 (1949).
Straight sentences which include a token suspended portion, e.g., 365 days
in custody with one day suspended, give rise to legal complications for the
court and the defendant when not accompanied by an explicit grant of pro-
bation. See RunIN, LAW or CRMrnAL CoRREcTioNs 185-90 (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as RuBIN]. Unfortunately, many judges follow this prac-
tice in an effort to retain jurisdiction for possible future modification. This
is particularly true in counties which have no parole system in operation
and therefore have no tribunal or agency with the power to reduce sen-
tences. See note 43 supra. Nevertheless, the use of both probation and
suspended sentences has been strongly advocated. See RuBix, 194-202.
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ance; i.e., commit to state prison or local custody, reinstate proba-
tion with new conditions and/or impose a fine; or
2. Suspend execution of sentence-the effect of which is to pro-
nounce judgment with a term of custody; i.e., either commitment
for the statutory term to state prison or for a specific term in local
custody and then stay the execution of the judgment and the com-
mitment order. If probation is subsequently revoked, and the court
refuses to reinstate it, the judgment previously entered must be
executed.
45
Although the ABA Standards4 6 create a virtual presumption in
favor of probation as a sentencing disposition, and developing pol-
icy has promoted its ever-increasing use,47 the grant of probation
rests in the court's "sound discretion." 48  Even if probation is of-
45. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (C) (West Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.1 (West 1970). For a further discussion of the interplay between
these two kinds of dispositions, see RunN 187-88.
In Boles v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 479, 112 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1974),
the court noted the interplay of such alternate dispositions and their effect
on the speedy trial/concurrent sentencing provisions of CAL. PENAL CODE §
1381 (West 1970). The court held that a defendant who has been sentenced
with the execution of sentence suspended does not benefit from the guaran-
tees of § 1381.
46. ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRImINAL JusTIcE RELATING TO PROBATION
§§ 1.1, at 21, 1.2, at 27 (Approved Draft 1970).
47. See notes 37, 38 supra. See also RuBIN 203-52.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 1975) provides, in pertinent
part:
If the court determines that there are circumstances in mitigation
of the punishment prescribed by law or that the ends of justice
would be subserved by granting probation to the person, it may
place him on probation.
See People v. Ozene, 27 Cal. App. 3d 905, 104 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1972). See
also Rutn 219-21; Hanscom, Probation-The Quiet Revolution, 50 CAL.
STATE B.J. 182 (1975).
The power of the trial court to grant probation in the absence of a direct
statutory prohibition (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203(d), 1203.06, 1203.07 (West
Supp. 1976)) is clear. In People v. Arredondo, 52 Cal. App. 3d 973,
125 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1975), the court upheld the trial court's order suspending
the execution of sentence and granting probation after the jury had found
the defendant guilty of violating CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp.
1976) and recommended state prison. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West
Supp. 1976).
Even though probation is the favored form of disposition, the courts ad-
here to the "ancient" doctrine of Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), that
probation is an act of "grace" to one convicted of a crime. "The granting
of probation is entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court; a de-
fendant has no right to probation . . . ." People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103,
323 P.2d 397, 413 (1958). Further, absent a clear showing of abuse of dis-
cretion, a judge's order denying probation will not be disturbed on appeal.
See People v. Brasley, 41 Cal. App. 3d 311, 115 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974); People
v. Troyn, 229 Cal. App. 2d 181, 39 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1964). But see ABA,
STANDARDS FOR CRmINAL JusTIcE RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SEN-
TENCES § 3.3 (ii), at 1 (Approved Draft 1968); People v. Edwards, 55 Cal.
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
fered to the defendant, he or she may refuse it.49 However a re-
fusal will probably annoy the court and result in some incarceration
and perhaps a fine,50 even though it is generally recognized that
the defendant should not be penalized for his decision.51
Should the court decide to grant a defendant probation, it has
a secondary issue to resolve-whether to order formal or summary
probation and the extent or duration of the probationary term.
52
Formal probation usually follows a pre-sentence interview and re-
port filed by the Probation Department 53 and involves the assign-
App. 3d 615, 127 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1976) hearing granted (April 22, 1976)
(whether a judge must support a denial of probation with a statement of
reasons).
49. Although the language of § 1203 arguably intimates that the defen-
dant's consent is unnecessary ("the court . . . may place him on proba-
tion"), the courts have upheld the defendant's right to refuse to accept a
probationary sentence. "[H] e does have the right, if he feels that the terms
of probation are more harsh than the sentence imposed by law, to refuse
probation and undergo such sentence." People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103,
323 P.2d 397, 413 (1958). Accord, People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App. 2d 624,
345 P.2d 282 (1959); Lee v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 2d 716, 201 P.2d 882
(1949).
50. Such a refusal will undoubtedly be viewed by the court as basically
a poor attitude requiring a stiffer penalty in order to achieve "rehabilitative
goals." In People v. Giminez, 14 Cal. 3d 68, 534 P.2d 65, 120 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1975), the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's order
imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment after the defendant refused to
accept five years of unsupervised probation conditioned on a limited waiver
of fourth amendment protections. See also People v. Renzulli, 39 Cal. App.
3d 675, 114 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1974); People v. Billingsley, 59 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 845, 139 P.2d 362 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., Los Angeles, 1943).
51. See People v. Giminez, 14 Cal. 3d 68, 73-81, 534 P.2d 65, 68-74, 120
Cal. Rptr. 577, 580-84 (1975) (Tobriner & Mosk, J.J., dissenting); RUBIN
212-14.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970) provides that the term of
probation upon conviction of a misdemeanor or a felony which carries less
than a three-year maximum sentence may not exceed three years. See Peo-
ple v. Ottovich, 41 Cal. App. 3d 532, 116 Cal. Rptr. 120 (1974); People v.
Schwartz, 80 Cal. App. 2d 801, 183 P.2d 59 (1947). In the case of a felony
conviction, the length of the probationary term cannot exceed the maximum
possible term of incarceration prescribed for such an offense. Therefore,
in appropriate cases, the court is within its discretion in ordering a life pro-
bation term. See People v. Dyer, 269 Cal. App. 2d 209, 74 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1969).
Pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West 1970), in the absence of a
successful probationary performance, the court may place a defendant on
probation even though the maximum term for probation has expired when,
prior to such expiration, there has been a revocation of probation. Under
this section, it is possible that a particular defendant could remain on proba-
tion indefinitely. See People v. Jackson, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 126 Cal. Rptr.
217 (1975); People v. Carter, 233 Cal. App. 2d 260, 43 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1965).
53. After a felony conviction, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1970)
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ment of a particular officer to supervise the probationer throughout
the normally extensive (three to five year) term of probation. For-
mal probation is usually reserved for felony and serious misde-
meanor offenders because of the desire for continuing supervision."4
In contrast, summary probation involves no direct supervision by
the probation office. It is therefore commonly referred to as "pro-
bation to the court" and is primarily employed in misdemeanor con-
victions.55
The final decision relevant to the grant of probation regards the
conditions imposed incident to the probationary order. The statute
invests the trial court with wide discretion in tailoring the condi-
tions of probation to meet the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
The impact of these conditions on the probationer can be substan-
tial. Aside from setting the length of the probationary term, the
court is empowered as a condition of probation to impose county
jail time,5 6 a fine,57 restitution,58 public work project perfor-
requires that the judge refer the case to the probation office for an investi-
gation and report to the court. That same section makes reference to the
probation office optional upon a misdemeanor conviction. See generally
People v. Beasley, 5 Cal. App. 3d 617, 85 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970); People v.
Lockwood, 253 Cal. App. 2d 75, 61 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1967).
54. See RuBIN 235-38.
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b) (West 1970) provides that in the case
of a misdemeanor conviction, the trial court may either refer the matter
to the probation office for an investigation and report, or summarily grant
(or deny) probation.
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970) would appear to permit the
trial court to impose a custody condition for any period not exceeding the
maximum term prescribed for the offense. However, CAL. PENAL CODE §
19a (West 1972) provides that the maximum term for commitment to a
county jail or other county penal facility is one year for each separate of-
fense. This limit applies to a commitment based on either a felony or mis-
demeanor conviction or a condition of probation. See People v. Jackson,
53 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 126 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1975).
A recent case, People v. Williams, 53 Cal. App. 3d 720, 125 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1975), held that upon revocation of probation, whether the probation order
was originally based on a felony or misdemeanor conviction, the defendant
must be given credit for time served as a condition of probation and that
the revocation resulted in the execution of statutory sentence. Cf. CAL.
PENAL CoD §§ 2900.5, 2900.6 (West Supp. 1970).
For a discussion of the imposition of custody as a condition of probation,
see RuBi 216-19.
57. A fine may not exceed the maximum amount prescribed by statute
for a violation for which the defendant is convicted. CAL. PENAL CODE §
1203.1 (West 1970). For those offenses which may be either felonies or
misdemeanors depending on the sentence imposed (see CAL. PENAL CODs
§ 17 (West Supp. 1976), the maximum fine depends on the ultimate classi-
fication of the offense. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 692 (West 1970) (unless
otherwise prescribed, the maximum fine for a misdemeanor is $500 and for
a felony, $5000). See, e.g., People v. Simon, 227 Cal. App. 2d 849, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 138 (1964).
58. Restitution is imposed to restore any loss suffered by the victim of
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mance, 59 or a requirement to work to support dependents.60 In ad-
dition, the court may impose
other reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and
proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be
made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to
any person resulting from such breach and generally and specif-
ically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer
* . . *61
In more tangible terms, the courts have moved under the empower-
ing statute to impose, or attempt to impose, one or more of the
following conditions of probation. The defendant must:
1. not drink and must stay out of bars and places where alcohol
sales are the chief business interest;
the crime, which in certain cases may be the government (see People v.
Baker, 39 Cal. App. 3d 550, 113 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1974)). See RuBIN 231-
32. Whether the restitution imposed may go beyond the actual loss as estab-
lished by the prosecution and as directly related to the convicted offense
is in doubt. See People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr.
905 (1975); People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967);
People v. Collins, 242 Cal. App. 2d 626, 51 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1966); Note, Use
of Restitution in the Criminal Process: People v. Miller, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
456 (1969). However, it is clear that restitution may not be imposed to
reimburse the state for the cost of prosecution and probation. People
v. Baker, 39 Cal. App. 3d 550, 113 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1974); People v. Labarb-
era, 89 Cal. App. 2d 639, 201 P.2d 584 (1949).
59. This condition would only be appropriate in those counties which
have established road camps, public farms and works projects (see CAL.
Gov. CODE § 25359 (West 1968)). If this condition is imposed, the proba-
tioner is normally remanded to the custody of county sheriff in accordance
with the provisions of CAL. PENAL CODE § 4100 et seq. (West 1970). See
32 Ops. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 48 (1958).
60. This condition will normally be imposed upon conviction of failure
to support. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1975). See RuiNn 232.
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970).
Generally, conditions of probation can be divided into three separate
groups: pecuniary conditions (fines, restriction, and support of depend-
ents); behavior conditions (observance of laws, limitations on travel and
association, employment, inter alia); and supervision conditions (submis-
sion to drug testing, submission to warrantless searches by the probation
officer, inter alia). See RuBIN 229-38.
In regard to pecuniary conditions, the ABA Standards strongly recom-
mend that the imposition of such conditions should not go beyond the abil-
ity of the probationer to pay. ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIVI-
riNAL JusTicE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(d), at 45, 49 (Ap-
proved Draft 1970). The ABA Standards further notes that behavioral and
supervisorial conditions should be related solely to rehabilitation in the
sense of helping the probationer lead a law-abiding life. Id. § 3.2(b), at
44-45, 47-48.
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2. not use any drugs and stay away from areas where addicts con-
gregate;
3. not gamble or have any gambling paraphernalia;
4. not possess any dangerous weapon or be in any building or ve-
hicle or in the presence of any place where such a weapon is;
5. not go into any area where homosexuals congregate;
6. not associate with certain people or classes of people who have
some relation to the kind of offense for which the defendant was
convicted (e.g., drug users, in the case of a drug related offense;
small children, in the case of some sexual offenses);
7. not cross the Mexican border or enter other foreign countries;
8. obtain additional rehabilitative services (e.g., psychiatric care,
educational, or vocational training);
9. seek and maintain regular employment;
10. submit to drug testing as ordered by the probation officer (nor-
mally imposed on heroin offenders);
11. submit his person and property to search by the probation offi-
cer or police officers on demand;
12. obey all laws, including orders of the probation officer.02
The list set out above is not exhaustive inasmuch as the court
is empowered to be creative in the formulation of probation condi-
tions to meet the circumstances of each case.68 Further, there is
no intent to imply that all these conditions may be properly im-
posed and present no constitutional difficulties. Indeed, at least
three limitations on the court's discretion in the formulation of con-
ditions have been outlined. Under challenge, a condition will be
held invalid if it:
1. has no relationship to the crime for which the offender was con-
victed;
2. relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal; or
3. requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to
future criminality.64
However, these limitations6 5 have been construed in favor of up-
62. See CAL. C.E.B., CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COUaRT CRnIMA TRIAL. JUDGES'
BENcHBOOKS, vol. 2, at 92 (1969); DAwsoN, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS
TO TYPE, LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 100-41 (1969).
63. CAL. PNAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970).
64. See In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 777, 463 P.2d 727, 733, 83 Cal. Rptr.
375, 381 (1970); People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1967). See also People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 905 (1975); People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr.
302 (1971); In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
See generally Imlay & Glasheem, See What Condition Your Conditions Are
In, 35 FED. PROB. 3 (June, 1971); Comment, Limitations Upon Trial Court
Discretion in Imposing Conditions of Probation, 8 GA. L. REV. 466 (1974).
65. These limitations, which were first formulated in People v. Domin-
guez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967), and recently reaffirmed
in People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975),
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holding the validity of the condition, and except for a flurry of
litigation in the area of first 66 and fourth67 amendment rights, ap-
are, in comparison with the approach of other courts, quite stringent. See,
e.g., Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965); State v. Oyler,
92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 709 (1968); People v. Higgins, 22 Mich. App. 479, 177
N.W.2d 716 (1970); State v. Rhinehart, 267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651 (1966);
Loving v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966). These later
decisions held for a straight reasonableness test. See also Tamez v. State,
19 Cmxw. L.R. 2026 (April 14, 1976).
66. The first amendment rights most often at the center of these contro-
versies concerned freedom of expression and association. While past courts
have been particularly unmoved by claims of free speech violations result-
ing from a probation condition (see, e.g., Morris v. State, 44 Ga. App. 765,
162 S.E. 879 (1932)), the modern trend recognizes that the condition which
impedes freedom of expression must at least be "reasonable." See Porth
v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d
953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971); Inman v. State, 124 Ga. App. 190, 183 S.E.2d
413 (1971).
Attacks upon conditions restricting freedom of association have enjoyed
even less success than "free speech" attacks. See United States v. Smith,
414 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 58 (1970);
People v. King, 267 Cal. App. 2d 814, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1028 (1970). However in In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92
Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971), the court invalidated a condition prohibiting member-
ship in radical political groups. In so holding the court suggested three
guidelines for determining when a condition may validly infringe on first
amendment freedoms: (1) when the condition reasonably relates to the
purpose sought by the probation code sections; (2) when the value accruing
to the public by imposition of the condition manifestly outweighs the right
impaired; (3) when no alternative means less intrusive of constitutional
rights exists (the least onerous alternative). Id. at 968, 92 Cal. Rptr. at
889.
67. The courts have generally upheld conditions that require the proba-
tioner to submit his person or property to search by the probation officer
or the police without the necessity of a warrant. See People v. Mason, 5
Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971); People v. Calais, 37 Cal.
App. 3d 898, 112 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1974); Russi v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App.
3d 160, 108 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1973); People v. Kern, 264 Cal. App. 2d 962,
71 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1968). In Mason, the court found that this type of con-
dition could pass the Dominiguez test (see text accompanying note 64 su-
pra) and that a warrantless search conducted pursuant to this condition
could be justified on the basis of the probationer's consent to the condition
in accepting probation. See Note, 1 Am. J. Cnmv. L. 235 (1972). However, the
courts have insisted that the condition be reasonably related to the proven
offense and aimed at deterring similar violations in the future. People v. Ma-
son, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971); People v. Kay, 36
Cal. App. 3d 759, 111 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1973); People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 1058, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973). See Note, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 153
(1973). Moreover, the courts have insisted that the probationer be given no-
tice prior to the search. See People v. Superior Court (Stevens), 12 Cal. 3d
858, 528 P.2d 41, 117 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1974).
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pellate review has been generally supportive of the trial court's
order.6 8
The dynamic nature of the probation process demonstrates the
need for continued vigilance on the part of defense counsel, begin-
ning with the imposition of the conditions and continuing through
to the expiration of the probation term.6 9 A condition validly im-
posed can soon work severe hardship and become unreasonable be-
cause of a change in circumstances. Moreover, it may become ap-
parent that the probationer will not be able to comply with a con-
dition. In such a case, the probationer can be subjected to revoca-
tion of probation or to a detrimental modification of conditions by
the probation officer or by the court's own motion.7 0 The key to
effective representation and decriminalization of the client on pro-
bation is the realization by counsel that although statutory author-
The future of such conditions, particularly because they permit police of-
ficers to search without a warrant, may be in doubt. See United States
v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
68. See, e.g., People v. Oaxaca, 39 Cal. App. 3d 153, 114 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1974); People v. Keefer, 35 Cal. App. 3d 156, 110 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1973);
In re Peeler, 266 Cal. App. 2d 483, 72 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1968).
After careful consideration of the facts of the case, the Peeler court up-
held a probation condition that had the effect of forcing the defendant to
live apart from her husband. Id. at 492-93, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61.
While attacks on probation conditions have not been completely success-
ful, counsel should not be deterred from challenging what is considered to
be an unreasonable or illegal condition. In In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767,
463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970), the court invalidated a condition re-
quiring psychiatric treatment when the record was totally devoid of any
indication that it was needed or would serve rehabilitative goals. In People
v. Johnson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 781, 104 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1972), the court struck
down a condition that an "indigent" defendant reimburse the government
for the costs of appointed counsel. Contra, Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40
(1974).
69. The ABA Standards explicitly recognize the need for continued scru-
tiny of probation conditions. ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRnvr-
iNAL JuSTiCE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.3, at 50 (Approved
Draft 1970). In the commentary to this section, the advisory committee
noted
that conditions once fixed should not become frozen into an irrevo-
cable pattern, but that the court should be able to respond to
changes in the defendant's circumstances or simply to new ideas
about how best to effect his reintegration into the normal life of
the community.
Id. at 51.
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(b) (West Supp. 1975) provides that:
Upon its own motion or upon the petition of the probationer or the
district attorney ... , the court may modify, revoke or terminate
the probation of the probationer ....
See also the recent discussion of the court's ability to revoke probation
on a charge upon which the defendant has been acquitted. In re Coughlin
- Cal. 3d -, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1976).
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ity exists to further entangle the probationer in the penal-correc-
tional system,7 1 statutory authority also exists to alleviate the onus
of the system. California Penal Code section 1203.3 provides that:
The court shall have authority at any time during the term of pro-
bation to revoke, modify or change its order of suspension of im-
position or execution of sentence. It may at any time when the
ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the good con-
duct and reform of the person so held on probation shall warrant
it, terminate the period of probation and discharge the person so
held . . . j2
It is clear from the language of this section that the sentencing
court retains wide discretion subsequent to placing an offender on
71. In re Coughlin, - Cal. 3d--, 127 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1976).
72. CAL. PENgAL CODE § 1203.3 (West 1970).
While both § 1203.3 and § 1203.2(b) contain provisions that could work
either to the probationer's advantage or detriment, the tenor of § 1203.3 sug-
gests that it was designed to be used for the probationer's advantage, and
§ 1203.2(b) appears designed to empower the imposition of penalties for
unsuccessful probationary performance. See Review of Selected 1970 Cal-
ifornia Legislation, 2 PAC. L.J. 279, 387 (1971). Therefore, counsel, when
moving on the probationer's behalf, should bring his motion pursuant to
§ 1203.3.
The broad discretion of the trial court during the term of probation based
upon § 1203.2(b) and § 1203.3 is retained in the proposed revision of the
California Penal Code. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RE--
VISION OF THE PENAL CODE, THE CRInvrIIAL PRocEDuRE CODE; PENAL CODE REVI-
SION PROJECT (STAPP DRAFT § 11508 1974) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE (STAFF DRAF)]. That section, designed to supplant §§
1203.2 and 1203.3, and to conform with both Gagnon v. Scarpeli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973), and People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 305 (1972), provides:
§ 11508 Modification, revocation, or termination of probation or
provisional release.
(a) The court may revoke or modify probation or provisional re-
lease only after a hearing upon written notice to the defendant of
the time and place of the hearing and the grounds upon which the
revocation or modification is proposed.
(b) At the hearing the defendant shall have the right to hear and
controvert the grounds upon which the revocation or modification
is proposed, to offer evidence or other materials in his behalf, and
to be represented by counsel.
(c) Upon a showing that it is warranted by the defendant's good
conduct, the court may, upon motion of the defendant or the Di-
rector of the Department of Probation, terminate probation or pro-
visional release and discharge the defendant.
This section has the added benefit of clarifying the role of the probation
department in taking the initiative to secure early release and termination
of probation.
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probation. The court's power to modify, revoke, or terminate con-
tinues throughout the probationary period and is not limited even
in cases in which a plea or sentence bargain has been accepted71
The court in People v. Allen74 took special note of the inviolate
power of the sentencing court to exercise continued supervision of
the probationer. In that case, defense counsel had bargained for
a sentencing recommendation by the prosecutor that included a
lengthy term of probation and three consecutive one-year terms in
the county jail as a condition of probation. One year after imposing
this negotiated sentence, the court modified its order, reducing one
of the one-year jail terms to nine months. In rejecting the People's
appeal, 5 the court upheld the modification and found that the sen-
tencing court did not abdicate its power to modify the probation
order despite the negotiated plea. The court stated:
The susceptibility of any probation order to modification is well
established and of vital importance to the purpose of this alterna-
tive to sentencing. Implicit, therefore, in any plea bargain . . . is
the possibility that probation may later be modified, revoked or
terminated.
Penal Code section 1203.3 and the rehabilitative purpose of proba-
tion make the post-judgment status of a probationer a matter for
the exclusive exercise of judicial power.70
73. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1975). Section 1192.5 pro-
vides that "plea bargains" may specify not only the charged offenses to
which the defendant will plead guilty but also the sentence to be imposed
by the court. However, many prosecuting offices refuse to enter into such
negotiated pleas which fix sentences. The proposed criminal code in fact
does not retain § 1192.5, for the drafters believed "that plea bargaining
does not represent a step forward for criminal justice." CRnVImINAL PROCEDURE
CODE (STAFF DRAFT) vii.
74. 46 Cal. App. 3d 583, 120 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1975).
75. The prosecution brought its appeal on the basis of CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1238(5) (West Supp. 1975), which permits the People to appeal from "an
order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people."
Id.
A defendant has the right to appeal from an order denying a petition
to modify or reduce probation brought pursuant to § 1203.3 (West 1970).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237 (2) (West 1970). See also People v, Theobald,
231 Cal. App. 2d 351, 41 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1964).
76. People v. Allen, 46 Cal. App. 3d 583, 589-91, 120 Cal. Rptr. 127, 130-
31 (1975).
Another form of this post-conviction judicial power which can be of bene-
fit to the probationer is set out in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (a) (West 1970).
This section provides that whenever a person on probation is convicted of
a subsequent offense and is thereupon sentenced to state prison, the proba-
tioner may obtain final disposition and sentence on the conviction underly-
ing the probation order, provided that the court receives notice of this new
commitment. The purpose of this statute is to permit a defendant to obtain
the benefit of a concurrent sentence should the court decide to revoke pro-
bation (based on the subsequent conviction) and execute sentence for the
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Having ascertained the legal parameters governing probation and
the potential role for counsel, one must consider the procedure
and factors surrounding a motion to modify or terminate pro-
bation. First, counsel must clearly define which changed cir-
cumstances77 merit the court's reconsideration of its original proba-.
tion order. The client may have made significant alterations in his
or her lifestyle or opportunities may have become available which
did not exist at the time of sentencing. For example, the proba-
tioner may have experienced a change in his or her family life. An
opportunity for employment or re-employment may have material-
ized. The client may have taken advantage of rehabilitative services
such as job training programs, formal education, or community-
based rehabilitation programs.7 8 In this respect, counsel can serve
as a catalyst by becoming familiar with available opportunities,
matching services with the client's need, and suggesting alternatives
to the court. After evaluating the specifics of the changed condi-
tions, counsel should formulate a theory justifying the request for
modification. In this respect, the nature of the probation condition at
issue (pecuniary, behavioral, supervisorial, or custodial) 79 should
be isolated and contrasted with the prevailing circumstances.
If incarceration has been imposed as a condition of probation,
8 0
the usual reasons are punishment and future deterrence. The court
initial offense. See Hayes v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 216, 490 P.2d 1137,
98 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1971); People v. Ruster, 40 Cal. App. 3d 865, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1974). The statute can be invoked only by written notice from
the defendant or his attorney, and, if the court fails to act within thirty
days of receipt of the notice, the statute purports to divest the court of juris-
diction over the defendant. However, such divestment occurs infrequently,
and reported cases exhibit an archaic "common law-strict construction"
approach to the issue of the legal sufficiency of such notice. See People
v. Como, 49 Cal. App. 3d 604, 123 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1975); People v. Ruster,
40 Cal. App. 3d 865, 115 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1974). Contra, People v. Carr, 43
Cal. App. 3d 441, 117 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1974). See also CAL. PENAL CODE §
1381 (West 1970), which provides an alternate and mostly duplicative pro-
cedure, but with a ninety-day time limit. The proposed revision to the
penal code seeks to consolidate and clarify these existing provisions. CPM-
INAL PROCEDURE CODE (STAFF DRAFT) §§ 10453, 11510.
77. See ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PROBATION § 3.3, at 50-51 (Approved Draft 1970).
78. The local probation department can provide counsel with a complete
list of available community-based rehabilitation programs. See STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF CRVImINAL JUSTICE PLANNING, A GUIDE TO CORRECTIONS
PLAmING IN CALIFORNIA (1975).
79. See note 61 supra.
80. More than half of all probationers in the State of California are in-
should be informed of changed conditions that make further incar-
ceration counterproductive to the rehabilitative goals of probation.
In addition, the mere passage of time may well convince the court
that the punishment and deterrence objectives of the custody condi-
tion have been achieved and that prolonged incarceration would
be pointless.81 With the incarcerated probationer, counsel might
seek a number of modified conditions relating solely to custody.
Most common is a request for modification of the custodial condi-
tion to that of time served, the effect of which is to obtain immedi-
ate release. As an alternative, a shortening of the custody term
may be suggested to the court.
In addition to the term of custody, modifications of the nature
of custody are available. The court has the statutory authority to
order intermittent custody, 2 and therefore the sentencing court
may modify the condition to authorize service in custody on week-
ends. Counsel should ascertain whether the county in which he
or she practices has utilized the provisions of Penal Code section
1208 and established a work furlough or education furlough pro-
gram.88 These programs shift custody to a more favorable work
or education furlough center and permit release from custody while
the individual is employed or is in school.84 On a more modest
carcerated as a condition of probation. A 1973 survey showed the state-
wide percentage to be 52.4. STATE Or CALiFoRNa, BuRAni oF C~mvNmL
STATiSTrCS, ADULT PROBATiON iN CALiFom'IA, 1973, at 28 (1974). California
exceeds all other jurisdictions in enforcing incarceration as a condition of
probation (see RuBIx 216-17 n.61) despite the fact that this kind of condition
has been called "a flagrant misconception or disregard of the underlying
principles of the entire probation scheme." 2 AToRY GENERAL'S SuRVEY
OF RELEASE PRocEDURE 249 (1970).
81. It has been the author's experience that most courts are not receptive
to a motion to modify a custody condition of probation until the probationer
has served at least one-half of the term imposed. However, in cases in
which a term longer than ninety days has been imposed, a motion should
be brought as a matter of course at the midway point in the term.
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1972).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1208 (West 1970).
Section 1208 was enacted by the legislature in 1957 and empowers indi-
vidual counties to establish both work and educational furlough programs
upon determining that such programs are "feasible" based upon the avail-
ability of employment and education and appropriate institutional facilities.
A replacement for the current § 1208 has already been passed by the legis-
lature. Known as the Cobey Work Furlough Law, the new § 1208 will be-
come effective on January 1, 1977. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1208 (West Supp.
1976).
Pursuant to § 1208.5, inmates of Work Furlough Programs may be trans-
ferred to similar programs in other cooperating counties. CAL. PENAL CoDE
§ 1208.5 (West 1970).
84. On the value of such programs to the offender and society, see Jeffery
& Woolpert, Work Furlough as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Assess-
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scale, counsel may contact the probation officer or sheriff and re-
quest a temporary, three-day release for the probationer within
thirty days prior to the established release date.8 5 Such a tempo-
rary release can aid the probationer's re-entry into the community.
Counsel should also consider possible modification of behavorial
and supervisorial conditions of probation, especially when these
conditions have begun to work an unnecessary hardship on the pro-
bationer. It should be demonstrated to the court either that the
good conduct of the probationer no longer requires imposition of
the condition or that the continuance of the restriction is counter-
productive to the rehabilitative process. A motion directed at these
conditions may seek either modification or elimination of a particu-
lar condition or early termination of the probationary term, thus
ending all forms of supervision and restriction. These requests are
often successful when the client has established an unblemished
record after a year of probation and shows positive signs of rejoin-
ing the mainstream of society. Counsel should be aware that some
conditions of probation, after a period of successful performance,
become of marginal utility to the court or the probation office.
Thus, they can be modified or eliminated with little or no opposi-
tion.
The procedure for obtaining modification of a probation order is
neither difficult nor time-consuming. At the outset counsel should
contact the client's probation officer if formal probation has been
imposed,80 because recommendations of the probation department
will carry significant weight with the judge who is being asked to
modify the probation order. Counsel may be able to discover the
attitude of the probation officer towards the client and the proposed
modification. This discovery could have strategic significance as
counsel prepares to petition the court. Finally, this contact pro-
maent of Its Effects on Recidivism and Social Cost, 65 J. Cnm . L.C. & P.S.
405 (1974); Rudoff & Esselstyn, Evaluating Work Furlough: A Followup,
37 FED. PROB. 48 (1973).
Unfortunately, utilization of the work and education furlough programs
has not been as great as expected. In Los Angeles County, reports have
indicated that as few as twelve per cent of the jail populace take advantage
of the available programs. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Feb. 14, 1975, at 1.
85. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4018.6 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.1a (West Supp. 1976).
86. See note 54 supra.
vides an opportunity for effective informal advocacy that may be
inappropriate at a formal hearing.
The next step involves the preparation and calendaring of the
motion for hearing.87 Although some practitioners adhere to "oral
motion" practice, a written notice and motion should be utilized.88
The mere existence of written pleadings enhances counsel's credibil-
ity and makes the motion stand out and merit serious consideration.
A written motion also serves as an effective advocacy device when
filed in those courts which read and consider pleadings prior to the
hearing.
Finally, as counsel approaches the hearing on the motion, he
should be prepared to conduct a well-organized and documented
presentation. Indeed, the analogy to a second sentencing hearing
is appropriate, and counsel should be equipped with the same data
and support that are used at sentencing.8 9 In this respect, family,
friends, employer, or counselors should be requested to attend the
hearing and be prepared to speak on the client's behalf.
MrIGATING REco1Ds OF ARREST AND CONVIcTION
Even after an individual has exited the criminal justice system,
87. In all cases the Rules of Court and local rules should be consulted.
See CALIFOaRNA RULES OF COURT (West 1975).
In calendaring the motion, counsel should be sure to afford the probation
department sufficient time to prepare and file a supplemental probation re-
port. Of course, local conditions and the particular probation officer's case-
load will determine the amount of notice required.
Finally, the question of the proper judicial officer to hear the motion may
present difficulty in properly setting the matter for hearing. The statute
authorizing modification merely refers to "the court" (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.3 (West 1970)) and does not specify whether such a motion must
go before the original sentencing judge who imposed the conditions of pro-
bation. Some superior courts pursue a practice of setting the motion in the
felony presiding department or the actual physical court and department
in which the probationer appeared for sentencing. If possible, the motion
should be brought before the judge who rendered the probation order. This
judge will at least have some familiarity with the case, and continuity in
treatment is therefore enhanced. Further, such practice avoids the possible
reluctance of some judges to "second-guess" his or her brother judge.
88. Should written pleadings be used, counsel might consider the use of
an "attorney's declaration" in support of the motion, detailing counsel's own
evaluation of the probationer and suggesting alternative treatment. This
declaration can be enhanced by attaching exhibits (e.g., letters of reference,
offers of employment, letters of support from family members). If a
memorandum of points and authorities is filed with the motion, it may be
brief, focusing merely on the statutory authority for modification and per-
haps pertinent ABA Standards (see note 69 supra) and reference works
about the objectives of probation.
89. For guidance and suggestions concerning both tactics and the attor-
ney's role in the sentencing hearing, see AmsTEmDAVI, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE
DEFENSE OF CnvmmuAL CASES, §§ 460-71 (3d ed. 1974); JONEs, CALIFoRNIA
CnvINAL CLINcAL PRAcTICE MANUAL chs. 9-10 (1975).
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the effects of a misdemeanor or felony conviction, or even an arrest,
can be significant.9 0 These effects can be direct, as when greater
punishment is imposed upon a subsequent conviction,91 or merely
the result of social and institutional prejudice, as when a criminal
record restricts or destroys employment opportunities.9 2 Regard-
less of the fact that the individual has paid his or her "debt to
society" or has been rehabilitated, "so far as concerns the individual
defendant, the act has been done, and no legal technicalities can
change this fact."93
In almost all cases, the collateral effects of a criminal conviction,
whether real or imagined, can be traced directly to the existence
90. Although the Constitution specifically prohibits "bills of attainder"
(U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9), both the laws and our social practices have per-
petuated a system that imposes civil and proprietary disabilities on con-
victed offenders-in effect "attainder." See Cohen & Rivkin, Civil Disabili-
ties: The Forgotten Punishment, 35 FED. PROB. 19 (1971). See also THE
PRESIDENT'S Com-IssioN oN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 88-92 (1967); Special Project,
The Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929
(1970); note 22 supra.
In recent years, convicted offenders, both in and out of the correctional
system, have challenged the loss of rights occasioned by a criminal convic-
tion. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (voting rights);
Seybold v. Milwaukee County Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Wis. 1967)
(capacity to sue); Bearden v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Ariz. App. 336, 483
P.2d 568 (1971) (right to workmen's compensation).
91. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 644, 666, 667 (West 1970).
92. See Taylor v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967);
Thomas v. Evangeline Parish School Bd., 138 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1962).
But see Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970); Mindel v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
See also THE PREsiDENT's CommssITON ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AnVEN-
iSTRATION OF JusTcE, Tim CaALLENGE OF CRan'E IN A FREE SocmETy 75 (1967);
Note, The Revolving Door: The Effect of Employment Discrimination
Against Ex-Prisoners, 26 HAsTnGs L.J. 1403 (1975).
Note should be taken of a recent amendment (AB 255, ch. 1043 and AB
1277, ch. 1117 (1975)) to CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.7 (West Supp. 1976), which
prohibits all employers, governmental and private, from asking applicants
for information concerning arrests or detentions that do not result in convic-
tions (see note 98 infra), from seeking such data by way of other sources,
or from using such information as "a factor in determining any condition
of employment including hiring, promotion or termination." Despite
explicit enforcement provisions ($200 to $500 damages to aggrieved per-
sons), the amendment establishes many exceptions which threaten to en-
velop the rule. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 432.7 (d), (e) (West Supp. 1976).
93. In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
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of the criminal record.94 Further, despite explicit statutory regu-
lation concerning the dissemination of such records, 5 genuine con-
cern is expressed by many clients that potential employers will
learn of the existence and content of records held by the Justice
Department's Bureau of Identification and Information (formerly
C.I.I.).96 Therefore, in spite of efforts designed to restore full lib-
erty and opportunity to the convicted offender,97 the need for the
mitigation of criminal records through the assistance of diligent
counsel is implicit in the decriminalization of the convicted client.
The collateral consequences resulting from a record may well be
suffered even by those who have only superficial contact with the
criminal justice system; i.e., those people who are arrested and re-
leased by the officer without further action.98 While such cases
seldom come to the attention of counsel, he should be aware that
California Penal Code section 851.6 mandates that the officer issue
the person a certificate describing the action as a detention.9 This
94. California has an elaborate statutory framework for the reporting,
compilation, examination and dissemination of criminal records. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11075 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). On January 1, 1978, the
Criminal Offender Record Information Act will go into effect. CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 13100 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). These new sections call
for much more detail in the reporting of criminal actions. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 13125 (West Supp. 1976).
The human side of this record compilation has been well documented.
See Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL. WEsT. L. REV. 126 (1965); Note,
Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 470
(1971).
Though a few jurisdictions have enacted statutes to mitigate the records
of criminal convictions, some writers have argued that sealing or even ex-
pungement of records does not guarantee secrecy. See Kogan & Loughery,
Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The Big Lie, 61 J. CRnM.
L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970). The authors contend that the order to seal or ex-
punge itself provides a "track" into the existence of a criminal record and
therefore the protective statutes are of little benefit. They conclude that
society must begin to accept those with "blemished" backgrounds.
95. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11075 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
96. A compelling narrative and record of some personal cases is set out
in Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 126 (1965).
97. See cases cited note 90 supra; Cal. Penal Code §§ 2600, 2601 (West
Supp. 1976).
In November, 1975, the California electorate strongly endorsed a constitu-
tional amendment which restored the right to vote to convicted felons. See
CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 3. This approval by popular vote was in sharp con-
trast to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), which found no equal protection violation in
the statutory scheme as it then existed. But see Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal.
3d 199, 507 P.2d 1345, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1973).
98. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 849 (b) (West Supp. 1975). But see generally
Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAc. L.J. 20 (1972).
99. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.6 (a) (West Supp. 1976).
This requirement does not apply to those arrested and released pursuant
to CAL. PENAL CODE § 849 (b) (2) (West 1970).
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section further requires that the records reflect that the action was
a detention.100 It is important to note that these same requirements
apply when the person is arrested and no criminal charges are
filed.101
If the person described above is a juvenile arrested for a misde-
meanor, counsel may take affirmative action on the client's behalf
to further mitigate the record. California Penal Code section 851.7
(a) (1)102 empowers a court, on petition of counsel, to order the re-
cord of detention sealed.10 3 Current legislation has passed the state
Assembly and Senate Judiciary Committee which would make sec-
tion 851.7 (a) (1) applicable to adults. 04
100. CAL. PEr CODE § 851.6(a) (West Supp. 1976). See also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11115 (West Supp. 1976).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.6 (b) (West Supp. 1976).
In these cases a higher probability exists that counsel will be aware of
the action, for § 851.6 (b) contemplates those cases in which the person is
released on bail and the prosecuting agency, rather than the police, decides
that the facts do not merit the filing of a criminal complaint.
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.7 (West Supp. 1975).
It is important to note that this section may be utilized to mitigate the
juvenile arrest record whether the petitioner is presently a minor or an
adult,
103. The term sealing should be distinguished from expungement. The
latter term denotes eradication or erasure of a record, i.e., a restoration of
the status quo ante. See Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records
of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q.
147, 149 (1966). See also Comment, Criminal Procedure: Expunging the Ar-
rest Records When There is No Conviction, 28 OxLA. L. REV. 377 (1975);
Note, The Effect of Expungement on a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 127 (1967). Despite the frequent use of the term expungement with
regard to the California statutory scheme (see, e.g., Note, 40 S. CAL. L. REV.
127 (1967)), the term does not accurately describe the limited effect of seal-
ing. While expungement contemplates destruction of the record, a sealed
record continues to exist and may, by court order, be unsealed. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 851.7 (f), 1203.45 (b) (West Supp. 1975).
The foremost benefit resulting from sealing is that the record is not avail-
able for official or public scrutiny and "thereafter such conviction, arrest,
or other proceeding shall be deemed not to have occurred, and the petitioner
may answer accordingly any question relating to their occurrence." CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 851.7 (b), 1203.45 (a) (West Supp. 1975).
104. See The Los Angeles Daily Journal, Feb. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 5. The
legislation is AB 491, sponsored by Assemblyman Willie Brown (D-San
Francisco).
Proposed legislation (CnVmsAL PROCEDURE CODE (STAFF DRAFT) § 11601)
would abolish the distinction between minors and adults for the pur-
poses of obtaining a sealed record.
A recent decision, People v. Municipal Court (Blumenshine), 51 Cal.
3d 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1975), vacated, hearing granted, Cal. Sup.
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Should criminal charges be filed, two initial points of reference
bearing on the mitigation of the record may become operable. If
the client is charged with a narcotics related offense, counsel should
determine whether diversion is available pursuant to California
Penal Code section 1000.105 In those cases in which diversion is
applicable, and the diversion program is successfully completed, the
record of the proceedings and arrest may be sealed.100 If the
charges involve offenses which may be treated as either a felony
or a misdemeanor,107 counsel should focus on the provisions of Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 17(b). 108 The classification of an offense
as either a felony or misdemeanor will have significant effects on
Ct. (Nov. 24, 1975), ordered an adult's arrest record sealed, finding
the exclusion of adults from the benefits of sealing was a denial of
equal protection. Contra, Loder v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 533
(1974), vacated, hearing granted, Cal. Sup. Ct. (Feb. 13, 1975). Both
Blumenshine and Loder raise the question of whether the courts possess
any inherent authority outside statutory guidelines to order the sealing of
records. See People v. Pruett, 51 Cal. App. 3d 329, 124 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1975); McMahon v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. App. 3d 194, 85 Cal. Rptr. 782
(1970); Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696
(1962); Alexander & Waltz, Arrest Record Expungement in California: The
Polishing of Sterling, 9 U. SAN. FR=. I, REv. 229 (1974); Gough, The Ex-
pungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A
Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1966). See also Menard v. Saxbe,
498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157
(1972); Hammons v. Scott, 9 CLEARING HousE REV. 109 (June, 1975) (case
pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief barring dissemination
of a record of arrest followed by a dismissal for lack of evidence).
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). See also
Note, Diversion and the Judicial Function, 5 PAc. L.J. 764 (1975); Note, The
California Experience with Pre-Trial Diversion, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 418 (1975).
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.5 (West Supp. 1976).
This section provides that the diversion proceedings and arrest record
shall be sealed and deemed to have never occurred. The statute further
prohibits the use of an arrest record for purposes of evaluating fitness for
employment, benefits, a license or certificate after a successful diversion
program.
It is unclear if the sealing of the record is automatic upon completion
of the diversion program or if the divertee is required to petition for seal-
ing.
Clearly relief afforded by § 1000.5 circumvents those provisions of
CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.7(e) (2) (West Supp. 1975) and CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.45(c) (West 1970), which prohibit sealing of records relating
to narcotics offenses. See also People v. Pruett, 51 Cal. App. 3d 329, 124
Cal. Rptr. 273 (1975); People v. Ryser, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1974).
107. Those offenses which may be punished by either a commitment to
state prison or by fine or commitment in the county jail (see, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 461(2) (West Supp. 1975)) are classified as felonies or mis-
demeanors depending on the ultimate sentence imposed. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 17(a), (b) (West Supp. 1975).
108. Id. § 17(b).
[VOL. 13: 804, 1976] Decriminalization
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the later availability of record mitigation relief. Immediate atten-
tion to section 17(b) is necessary because the classification of the
offense may be made at either the time the charges are filed, 10 9
at the preliminary examination, 01 0 at sentencing,"' or after proba-
tion has been granted."
2
In those cases in which defense counsel is successful on the merits
and the case is dismissed or the client is acquitted, the records of
the case and the arrest may be sealed. If the client is a juvenile
at the time the offense is committed and proceedings are dismissed
or an "acquittal" 113 is obtained, a petition to seal the records is ap-
propriate.114  In the case of an adult who is acquitted and whom
the trial court declares "factually innocent," the court may, on mo-
tion, order the case and arrest records sealed." 5
Should the proceedings result in a conviction, the availability and
extent of record mitigation relief hinge upon three factors: (1)
109. Id. § 17(b) (4).
This provision permits the prosecuting attorney to file an alternate fel-
ony-misdemeanor as a misdemeanor unless the defendant objects.
110. Id. § 17(b) (5).
At or before the preliminary examination the magistrate is empowered,
pursuant to this section, to declare the offense a misdemeanor.
111. Id. §§ 17(b)(1), (2).
If the court imposes a punishment other than imprisonment in the state
prison, or commits the defendant to the California Youth Authority (see
CAL. WE L. & INST'NS CODE § 1731.5 (West 1972)), the offense is deemed a
misdemeanor.
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (b) (3) (West Supp. 1975).
In those cases in which the court grants probation without the imposition
of sentence (see note 45 supra), the court may thereafter, on motion of the
defendant or the probation officer, declare the offense a misdemeanor.
113. A juvenile is technically not acquitted; rather, the juvenile court is
said to be without jurisdiction. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602
(West Supp. 1975).
114. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 851.7 (a) (2), (3) (West Supp. 1975).
Special note should be paid to those provisions of § 851.7 which carve
out exceptions to the relief afforded by the section. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 851.7(d) (West Supp. 1975). But see People v. Pruett, 51 Cal. App. 3d
329, 124 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1975), declaring § 851.7(e) (2) unconstitutional in
part.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1976). See also CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 11105.5, 11116 (West Supp. 1976).
Because § 851.8 has only recently taken effect, there are no reported cases
construing the statute. However, it is clear that the section creates an in-
triguing concept---"factual innocence"-that might be the subject of much
litigation. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
whether probation is granted; i"6 (2) whether the offense is classi-
fied as a felony or misdemeanor;"17 and (3) whether the status of
the client is that of a minor or an adult. 1 8 A client who has been
convicted of a misdemeanor and denied probation or convicted of
a felony or misdemeanor and granted probation is eligible for relief
under California Penal Code sections 1203.4(a) and 1203.4, respec-
tively. The qualifications for eligibility under these sections are
substantially the same. In the main, the client must have success-
fully completed the sentence or term of probation and at that time
not be incarcerated or on probation for another offense or facing
criminal charges. The relief afforded by the two sections is
identical.
The defendant shall... be permitted by the court to withdraw
his plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of
not guilty; or if he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty,
the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case,
the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information
against the defendant and he shall thereafter be released from all
penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he has
been convicted."l 9
In the case of a client who was under eighteen at the time the
misdemeanor 120 was committed, the relief afforded by sections
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1972).
117. See id. § 1203.4(a). See also notes 107-12 supra.
118. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1975).
This section has specifically been held applicable only to a person who
is under eighteen at the time of the commission of a misdemeanor. Loder
v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1974), vacated, hearing granted,
Cal. Sup. Ct. (Feb. 13, 1975). However, a decision from the Supreme Court
of California in the Loder case is forthcoming.
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1975). The relevant portion
of § 1203.4(a) differs in only a few, inconsequential particulars.
Neither section affords relief to an individual convicted of violating subdi-
vision (b) of section 42001 of the California Vehicle Code. See CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1203.4(b), 1203.4(a) (b).
While the sections purport to release the defendant from "all penalties
and disabilities resulting from the offense," both sections reserve the right
to use the "prior" in a subsequent conviction, and § 1203.4 preserves the
prohibition against felons possessing a handgun (id. § 12021). By judicial
interpretation, § 1203.4 relief does not prevent enhanced punishment upon
a subsequent conviction (id. § 3024). People v. Dutton, 9 Cal. 2d 505,
71 P.2d 218 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 656 (1937). Nor does it pre-
vent use of a felony conviction to impeach in a subsequent prosecution.
CAL. Evm. CODE § 788(c) (West 1966). See People v. O'Brand, 92 Cal. App.
2d 752, 207 P.2d 1083 (1949). In People v. Sharman, 17 Cal. App. 3d 550,
95 Cal Rptr. 134 (1971), the court held that the statutes are directed only
to those penalties and disabilities from which the state can release the of-
fender but do not effect the revocation of a business or professional license
or deportation. Id. at 552, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
120. If the offense occurred prior to March 7, 1973, and the defendant
was under twenty-one at that time, the relief afforded by § 1203.45 is avail-
able. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.45 (e) (West Supp. 1975).
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1203.4 and 1203.4 (a) is available, and in addition, the record of arrest
and conviction may be sealed pursuant to California Penal Code
section 1203.45.121 The arrest and conviction are deemed not to have
occurred, and the client may answer any question relating to the
event accordingly.
1 22
Although no authority exists for the full mitigation of the. records
of an individual convicted of a felony and denied probation, counsel
should be aware that action can be initiated to promote the legal,
psychological, and social decriminalization of the convicted of-
fender. It is within the power of the governor to grant pardons,
12 3
and a regular procedure is available for obtaining a pardon for a
client who has been released from prison. 1 24 Upon the fulfillment
of conditions demonstrating the offender's rehabilitation, 12 5 coun-
sel120 may petition the court for a declaration and certificate of re-
habilitation. 2 7 If the court finds that the petitioner has demon-
strated his or her rehabilitation, it shall issue a certificate of reha-
bilitation and forward the certificate to the governor with a recom-
mendation for pardon.12  If a pardon is granted, all rights, priv-
ileges and franchises are restored to the petitioner. 2 9 Whenever
121. Id. § 1203.45. Subdivision (b) of the section makes the relief
available to those convicted before the effective date of § 1203.45. However,
it is important to note those circumstances which make the section inap-
plicable. Id. §§ 1203.45(c), (d). But see People v. Ryser, 40 Cal. App.
3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974), declaring § 1203.45(c) unconstitutional in
part.
122. See note 103 supra.
123. See CAL. CoNsT. art. V, § 8; CAL. PENAL CODE § 4800 (West 1970).
124. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
125. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4852.03, 4852.05 (West 1970).
These sections require a specified period of residence in the state after
release from prison or parole C§ 4852.03), and a showing of a law-abiding
life C§ 4852.05).
126. The petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel throughout the
proceedings, and if the petitioner is without counsel, the public defender
is required to represent the offender. See id. §§ 4852.04, 4852.08; Ligda v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 811, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970).
127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.06 (West Supp. 1975).
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.13 (West 1970).
129. Id. § 4853.
As with the relief afforded by §§ 1203.4 and 1203.4(a) (see note 119
supra), the effect of a pardon is limited. A pardon abolishes restrictions on
liberty and restores civil rights. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.17 (West Supp.
1975); Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
614 (1939).
a certificate of rehabilitation or pardon is granted, the action is re-
flected on the client's criminal record. 10
Finally, mention should be made of record mitigation relief af-
forded under California's reformed marijuana law.1' 1 With this
law, California takes its first step toward expunging' 82 a criminal
record. The record of arrest and conviction for a violation involv-
ing simple possession of marijuana or transporting or giving away
less than an ounce of marijuana will be automatically destroyed
two years after the date of the arrest or conviction.188 Of greater
importance to counsel, however, is that provision'8 4 of the new law
authorizing expungement of a record of arrest or conviction based
on a violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11357
or a statutory predecessor, 8 5 occurring before January 1, 1976, the
effective date of the new law. 8 6 To obtain this relief, the defen-
dant must petition the court in the county of arrest or conviction
and may be required to pay up to $50.00 to cover the costs of de-
struction. 37 In addition to the obvious benefits of expungement,
the new statute prohibits any public agency from denying, limiting,
or revoking an opportunity, license, or permit based upon an arrest
or conviction, the record of which has been destroyed. 88
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on two of the many aspects relating to
the plight of the convicted offender and counsel's role in the con-
130. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.17 (West Supp. 1975).
131. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
See Uelman, California's New Marijuana Law: A Sailing Guide for
Uncharted Waters, 51 CAL. STATE B.J. 27 (1976).
132. See note 103 supra.
133. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11361.5 (a), (c) (West Supp. 1976).
134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFP=y CODE § 11361.5(b) (West Supp. 1976).
135. Prior to the enactment of the new marijuana legislation, § 11357 pro-
scribed the possession of any quantity of marijuana, making it an alternative
felony-misdemeanor upon the first conviction, and a felony thereafter. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West Supp. 1976). Section 11357 was
formerly § 11350. Id.
136. The Attorhey General has issued an opinion which holds that §
11361.5(b) does not apply to those who are currently serving a sentence
enhanced by a prior marijuana conviction. Further, the opinion construes
the statute to include an implied limitation that the relief afforded by §
11361.5(b) will not be available until two years after the date of arrest or
conviction for a violation under the old law. - Os. CAL. ATTY. GEN.
-, No. C.R. 75-50 (Jan. 16, 1976).
137. See note 134 supra.
138. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.5(d) (West Supp. 1976).
For the effect of § 11361.5 on subsequent similar prosecutions, see - Ops.
CAL. ATTY. GEN. -, No. C.R. 75-50 (Jan. 16, 1976). See also Uelman,
California's New Marijuana Law: A Sailing Guide for Uncharted Waters,
51 CAL. STATE B.J. 27, 76 (1975).
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tinued representation of a convicted client. The responsibilities de-
scribed herein are doubtlessly applicable to the majority of clients
represented by criminal law practitioners. And yet, even though
there is evidence of a move to decriminalize many acts,' 39 there
remains a need for the decriminalization of the convicted offender.
Obviously, the dimensions of the appropriate role of counsel in
providing continued representation after conviction remain to be
precisely defined.' 40 However, the individual practitioner must
begin to explore his or her potential role and resolve what the ef-
fective assistance of counsel means to each criminal defendant rep-
resented. If a client unnecessarily suffers from a condition of pro-
bation capable of being modified, or from the effects of a "non-
mitigated" criminal record, counsel's inactivity may result in serious
professional liability. At least two commentators have projected
that future criminal malpractice claims will not hinge on massive
trial errors but rather on the failure to insure the client the fullest
protection of the law.141 It is hoped that the issue of proper post-
conviction representation will not be pushed into the malpractice
arena and that, with the recognition of the potential role of counsel,
there will be a voluntary and enthusiastic assumption of responsi-
bility by counsel.
139. The new marijuana legislation (see note 131 supra) and the Con-
senting Adults Act (see Comment, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439 (1976)) are
but two examples.
140. In Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Cal. 1975), Judge Mac-
Bride denied a motion to dismiss a complaint brought by two attorneys pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871) claiming that correctional officials inter-
fered with their right to practice by the creation of conditions at Folsom
prison. The two attorneys were representing an inmate at Folsom seeking
post-conviction relief. The court elevated practice to a right guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. 398 F. Supp. at 760.
141. See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections
on Criminal Malpractice, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191 (1974).
It [malpractice) is far more likely to be an asserted failure to uti-
lize to the fullest the various procedural protections, constitutional
and statutory, to which the client is entitled. Id. at 1230.
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2. See CAL. WELP. & INST'NS CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. WELF.
& INST'Ns CODE § 1179 (West 1972), regarding records of juvenile court
dispositions.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.7 (West Supp. 1976), defines a minor as under
twenty-one prior to March 7, 1973, and as under eighteen subsequent
thereto.
4. Note that the scope of "sealing" relief sweeps in all related records
regarding this first offense, including those covered by CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 851.7 (West Supp. 1976).
5. This particular limitation has been held unconstitutional in part. See
cases cited note 121 supra.
6. See notes 131-38 and accompanying text supra.
7. By legislative omission, and unlike CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West
Supp. 1976), a petitioner here is not disqualified if presently on probation
for another offense.
